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Abstract: 
 
The paper reviews the state of policy on antimicrobial use and the growth of antimicrobial 
resistance (AMR). AMR was anticipated at the time of the first use of antibiotics by their 
originators. For decades, reports and scientific papers have expressed concern about AMR 
at global and national policy levels, yet the problem, first exposed a half-century ago, 
worsened. The paper considers the explanations for this policy failure and the state of 
arguments about ways forward. These include: a deficit of economic incentivisation; 
complex interventions in behavioural dynamics; joint and separate shifts in medical and 
animal health regimes; consumerisŵ; ďelief iŶ teĐhŶologǇ; aŶd a Ŷaƌƌatiǀe that iŶ a ͚ǁaƌ oŶ 
ďugs͛ Ŷatuƌe ĐaŶ be beaten by human ingenuity. The paper suggests that these narratives 
underplay the biological realities of the human-animal-biosphere being in constant flux, an 
understanding which requires an ecological public health analysis of AMR policy 
development and failure. The paper suggests that effective policy change requires 
simultaneous actions across policy levels. No single solution is possible, since AMR is the 
result of long-term human intervention which has accelerated certain trends in the 
evolution of a microbial ecosystem shared by humans, animals and other biological 
organism inhabiting that ecosystem. Viewing the AMR crisis today through an ecological 
public health lens has the advantage of reuniting the social-ecological and bio-ecological 
perspectives which have been separated within public health. (227 words) 
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Introduction: a question of perspective 
 
The problem of antimicrobial resistance (AMR) has been much documented worldwide. The 
persistence of the problem suggests that policy responses have been inadequate or at best 
have not yet worked. This paper considers what those policy responses are, how they have 
been framed and by whom.  It proposes that the language and focus of the policy discourse 
indicate a deep structural problem not just for public health but also for food system 
management. AMR thus illustrates the pertinence of the ecological public health approach 
and obstacles to it being mainstreamed.  In this paper we use the term AMR, although much 
puďliĐ disĐouƌse has used ͚aŶtiďiotiĐ ƌesistaŶĐe͛.  AMR refers to resistance developing to 
anti-bacterial, anti-viral and other medicines used against pathogenic infections; it is the 
more accurate term to describe the public health problem. Most of the public focus and 
attention, however, has been focused on worsening resistance amongst bacteria, and the 
diminishing effectiveness of antibiotics used to treat infections caused by pathogenic 
ďaĐteƌia. IŶ the ĐoŵŵoŶ ǀeƌŶaĐulaƌ, ͞aŶtiďiotiĐ͟ ƌesistaŶĐe is ofteŶ used sǇŶoŶǇŵouslǇ ǁith 
AMR.  
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Evidence about AMR has mounted for decades, and concerns about the consequences of 
antibiotics overuse hastening AMR and rendering antibiotics ineffective were made well 
over half a century ago.1, 2 Policy responses to the threat  have been varied, ranging from 
denial to the nigh apocalyptic, from anticipating  a world without effective antibiotics and 
implicitly anticipating a return to a time before the Second World War,3 to calls for a 
massive public investment in a new generation of drugs.4 Since the evidence base for 
concern about AMR has only strengthened with each passing decade, it is both timely and 
important to consider why policy makers have been so slow to respond to earlier warnings 
based upon that evidence, and the calls for more urgent action. The World Health 
Organization (WHO) among others has puzzled over this slow transition from evidence to 
action. 5 
 
To some extent, AMR policy is another example of the gap between evidence, policy and 
behaviour change that has been all too familiar in the history of public health policy 
development. The UK͛s NatioŶal IŶstitute of CliŶiĐal EǆĐelleŶĐe, foƌ iŶstaŶĐe, issued its fiƌst 
formal guidance to General Practitioners and health workers on over-use and misuse in 
August 2015.6 The paper suggests that policy makers are being offered a narrative of crisis 
which itself carries some risks. Such a narrative presumes that policymakers and regulators 
need to reassert control, with policy messages framed by notions of containment, order and 
authority in contrast to fears about messiness, disorder or anarchy. In our view, part of the 
complexity for policy-makers has lain in the different management systems for human and 
animal health, and the segmentation of state institutions responsible for public health and 
for food and farming.  
 
The reasons for concern about diminishing antibiotic effectiveness are clear and real. The 
growing seriousness of AMR, and its human impacts, have been documented elsewhere.5  
Antibiotics are in wide use globally on both humans and animals.  Countries vary 
enormously in antibiotic use, especially when adjusted on a per person or per animal basis. 
Taking animal production, the WHO has reported that Norway uses relatively small 
amounts, 20mg to produce 1 kg of meat, for example, whereas the Netherlands uses 180 
mg to produce one kg, and the USA an estimated 300 mg.5, 7 In the US, the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) reported that 13.5 million kgs of all US antimicrobials – some 80% of 
the total – were sold for use in agriculture in 2011.8 Of US sales of medically important 
antibiotics – penicillins, macrolides, cephalosporins and other antibiotics of human 
importance – more than 70% in 2011 were sold for use in livestock and poultry, not for use 
in medicine; less than 3.3 million kilograms of antibacterials were sold for use in human 
medicine that same year.9 By size China is the largest antibiotics producer and consumer in 
the world. In a 2007 survey, the estimated annual antibiotics production in China was 210 
million kg, of which 46.1% were used in livestock industries.10 With such heavy, routine use, 
AMR is unsurprising. 
 
AMR is an issue that draws out divergent perspectives on the role of policy. Some call for 
technical development (new drugs); others for legal change (tougher regulatory controls); 
others for behaviour change (less and more judicious use). Some focus on AMR risks to 
humans; others to animal husbandry. Some call for the application of a systems perspective 
and ͚good ŵultileǀel goǀeƌŶaŶĐe͛ as the keǇ to suĐĐessful ĐoŶtaiŶŵeŶt;11 others for tighter 
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prescription rules only. Here is where an ecological public health (EPH) perspective helps 
make sense; it reduces the policy cacophony͛ – different solutions vying for policy 
attention.12  
 
EPH locates human health problems as the result of interactions between human 
physiology, context, and the flow of inputs and outputs.13   Although it has a long history, 
shaped by mid 19thcentury Darwinian analysis and subsequent scientific breakthroughs such 
as germ theory, the isolation of bacteria and viruses, and latterly gene typing, ecological 
thinking is today mostly associated in public health with the social-ecological perspective.14-
16 The social-ecological perspective, valuable though it has been, has focussed on social 
environment and dynamics as a determinant of health; the public health importance of the 
physical and biological environment has been somewhat overlooked. Surely a more full 
understanding of the dilemma raised by AMR requires both strands of ecological thought: 
the biological and the social. The strength of the term ͚ecological͛ is its ability to capture the 
dualistic and interactive relationship of humans and nature. In the biological sciences the 
notion of ecological research has more closely retained the Darwinian meaning that Haeckel 
(who coined the word) gave it,17 where ͚eĐologiĐal͛ refers to the multi-layered interactions 
of complex life forms.  
 
Within public health, ecological public health is the term now used to reclaim this broader 
conception of public health promotion as the task of unravelling bio-human-social 
connections and reconfiguring them to create the conditions for good rather than poor 
health.13 The relevance of EPH thinking is apparent in issues as varied as recognition that 
climate change requires societal change,18 to new ways of treating sewage,19 and cancer.20 
In this sense, ecological thinking is the science of interdisciplinary research stretching across 
life in its multiple levels and forms and which engages assumptions of complexity, 
emergence, habit, novelty and system. AMR illustrates the need for the two ecological 
traditions – the biological and the social –once more to be one, albeit with neither being 
reducible to the other. This is a complex perspective to translate and ͚sell͛ to poliĐǇ ŵakeƌs. 
 
Documenting the rise in policy concern 
 
Over their first several decades, what has ďeeŶ ƌefeƌƌed to as the ͚goldeŶ age͛ of aŶtiďiotiĐ 
use, their impact was miraculous.21 They were remarkably effective in tackling an array of 
everyday infections, sexually transmitted infections, tuberculosis, pneumonia and more. Yet 
expert advice now concludes their efficacy is under extreme threat.5, 22, 23 Half of all 
antibiotic consumption may be unnecessary, yet sales via the internet are growing.3 The 
concern about over-use and misuse is not new.  Both Sir Alexander Fleming, the discoverer 
of penicillin, and René Dubos, the discoverer of gramicidin (an antibacterial agent that 
inhibits the growth of gram-positive bacteria) predicted AMR in the 1940s. The fact of 
antimicrobial resistance had been observed in the 1930s.24  When accepting his Nobel Prize 
in 1945,Fleming worried that the tiŵe ŵight Đoŵe ǁheŶ peŶiĐilliŶ ͞ĐaŶ ďe bought by 
aŶǇoŶe iŶ the shops͟ aŶd thus iŶeǀitably expose microbes to non-lethal quantities of the 
dƌug aŶd ͞ŵake theŵ ƌesistaŶt͟.25 Penicillin was initially obtained without medical 
prescription and penicillin resistant bacterial strains were first isolated in significant 
numbers in 1946.26 
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Fleming, Dubos and others realised then, as others much more recently had seemingly 
forgotten, that antimicrobials were likely (perhaps bound) to lose potency due to the 
intrinsic nature of microbial evolution.27 These were valuable substances not to be used 
lightly. Such warnings jarred with the technological impetus of these years, continuing on to 
today, and as such were denounced as hubristic by ecological writers like Lewis Mumford.28 
In the 1950s, antibiotics as a technology gained a similar allure to nuclear power, with the 
same warm glow of technological modernity, technical efficiency and problem resolution.  
Nuclear power (and bombs) came to the fore at roughly the same time yet were regulated 
and controlled by tight state controls and fiercely bureaucratised access, if with fewer 
considerations about the long-issue of nuclear waste. The analogy between nuclear power 
and AMR is found in the framing of early debates around their use as ͚use versus abuse͛ (or 
use versus misuse), a conventional distinction within mid 20th century science policy, with 
the technology in each case being depicted as neutral and free of ideological contamination.  
 
Decades later, the applicability of this framing to antibiotics and AMR are open to debate.  It 
is what recent science policy analysts have referred to as one of its ͚fƌaŵiŶg assuŵptioŶs͛.29, 
30 Understandable intentions are built into antimicrobials such as the human desire to 
protect health by controlling nature, but these also sit alongside other framing assumptions 
– however incorrect -- such as that life forms are static, or that humans are in control of 
nature, or that medicines that are effective at one point in time will always be so.  As Dubos 
argued constantly, none of these assumptions, given the dynamism of evolutionary 
processes, is beyond question and indeed they represent a form of scientific and policy 
͚utopiaŶisŵ͛.31  
 
The history of the use of antimicrobials is an important element to build into policy analysis, 
and it should not be left to historians, if only because antibiotics, as non-renewable 
resources, leave a long (biological) shadow of their previous pattern of use. If there is to be 
sound policy on AMR, policy makers must learn why such early warnings were 
disregarded.32 Investigations by Dubos1, 33, 34 and others35 pointed to the need to treat 
biological agents with extreme caution. Human health should be located in its wider 
biological, material, social and cultural context, Dubos argued.  More recent thinking in this 
mould ƌeaffiƌŵs Duďos͛ aƌguŵeŶts. BaƋueƌo aŶd colleagues, for example, although using 
the term antibiotic resistance, see this as a ĐoŶseƋueŶĐe of  ͞aŶthƌopogeŶiĐ alteƌatioŶs iŶ 
different environments, with consequences in human health and possibly in the health of 
the ďiospheƌe͟.36 In effect, human health cannot be separated from eco-systems health; 
indeed even if the focus is on the health of human physiology alone, this requires us to 
locate the body within a complex interplay of factors and forces, recognising too that past 
human activity has also changed the environment.  
 
The early warnings from pioneers were almost immediately backed by reputable national 
bodies in Western countries which normally have considerable influence over global policy, 
but on AMR there appears to have been slower support at the international and 
multinational level.  Table 1 lists some early reports by high standing national bodies. Table 
2 documents AMR warnings at the international level, mostly since 1998. The tables suggest 
not that there has been no policy but that there has been much; if so, these policies must be 
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judged to have partially or largely unsuccessful, and  is why analysts should give more 
attention to what has stopped follow-up and implementation.  
 
The USA was the first big user of antibiotics in animal rearing. In 1956, the US National 
Academies of Science and National Research Council hosted the first international 
conference on antibiotic use in agriculture where concerns about over-use were voiced in 
evolutionary and ecological terms. At the dinner address of the conference, Dubos stated: 
͞[i]t is eǆtƌeŵelǇ diffiĐult, if Ŷot iŵpossiďle, to foƌesee the ultiŵate ĐoŶseƋueŶĐes of aŶǇ 
intervention even when it consists in the use of a selective drug effective against only one or 
a ǀeƌǇ feǁ ĐoŵpoŶeŶts of the eĐologiĐal sǇsteŵ.͟37 In 1969 the Swann committee published 
its concerns in the UK,38 and in 1977 the US Food & Drug Administration (FDA) tried 
unsuccessfully to regulate or ban routine use of penicillins and tetracyclines in animals 
feeds.39, 40 
 
Table 1 Some national warnings of AMR, 1950s-90s 
 
Date Body Country Action Comment  
1956 National Academies 
of Science  
USA Hosted First International 
Conference on the Use of 
Antibiotics in Agriculture 
Early concerns about AMR and antibiotic 
overuse 
1969  Swann Report UK Report on antibiotic use by 
veterinary medicines  
͚laŶdŵaƌk͛ ƌepoƌt led to ǁithdƌaǁal of 
some antimicrobials from list of authorised 
antibiotic growth promoters in some EU 
countries (1972-74)  
1977 FDA USA FDA begins hearings to 
withdraw routine use of key 
antibiotics (penicillins, 
tetracyclines) in animal feeds 
Industry strongly resisted the prospect of 
legal controls 
1986 Swedish Agriculture 
Ministry 
Sweden Ban on antimicrobial growth 
promoters 
A reversal of a 1977 warning that AMR was 
not a concern! Some follow-up by Denmark 
and UK 
1992 General Accounting 
Office 
USA Recombinant Growth Hormone  Expressed concern about use of antibiotics 
in growth hormones 
1998 House of Lords UK Resistance to Antibiotics ͞a ŵajoƌ thƌeat to puďliĐ health͟ 
1998 European Union 
Chief Medical 
Officers 
EU Copenhagen Recommendations ͞International spread of micro-organisms 
means that resistance to antimicrobial 
agents can no longer be regarded as a 
national problem. It is a European and 
global problem and requires a common 
stƌategǇ.͟ 
 
 
Those failed 1977 FDA initiatives are important. Citing the opinion of FDA scientists, that 
antibiotics in animal feed posed a threat to public health, the Agency promised – and then 
failed to bring about -- firm action to stop that misuse.  Some 35 years later, the issue re-
emerged for public review in a legal case brought in 2012 by a US environmental NGO 
questioning what it regarded as 35 years of FDA inaction.41 Specifically it asked why the FDA 
had weakened its proposed policy from one based on legislation to one invoking self-
regulation. The use/abuse model of science in policy, in effect, did not apply. In fact, the 
policy was shifted from reliance on ͚haƌd͛ to ͚soft͛ poliĐǇ ŵeasuƌes, suggesting – to invoke 
another theory from political science - that the FDA was suffering from what Bernstein in 
the 1950s teƌŵed ͚ƌegulatoƌǇ Đaptuƌe͛, the pƌoĐesses ďǇ ǁhiĐh ƌegulatoƌǇ ďodies ďeĐoŵe 
subservient to the industry they were established to regulate.42 43 
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But if this was the case, the FDA would have not come up with tough proposals in the first 
place. The more plausiďle eǆplaŶatioŶ is that the FDA͛s failuƌe to iŵpose a Ŷeǁ Đultuƌe on 
industry illustrates what might be termed ͚deƌegulatoƌǇ Đaptuƌe͛ (i.e. the inverse of 
͚regulatory capture͛). This is where a business sector exerts strong political pressure to stave 
off a potential threat to its business logic and seeks to avoid regulation or presses for its 
elimination. The business logic here is and was the routine addition to animal feed of 
relatively cheap antibiotics, both to get animals faster to slaughter weight on less feed, as 
well as to offset the infection risks created by raising animals in modern, intensive systems 
often marked by crowding, poor hygiene and nutrition and stress. These intensification 
methods served to raise more animals with less land and labour requirements, albeit with 
more consumption of antibiotics and energy, and creation of more resistant bacteria, air 
and water pollution. So long as the short-term costs of the latter could be controlled or 
avoided, the intensive model appeared to be more efficient and produce lower cost meat 
for the consumer.   
 
Sweden provides another insight to the pressures on policy. In 1977, its Agricultural Board 
conducted an inquiry into AMR, concluding that the risks were negligible, only for the 
farmers in 1984 to ask for antibiotics to be banned from feedstuffs following consumer 
concerns. In 1986, antibiotics were banned from animal feed use as growth promoters, as 
further concerns for human health were voiced.44, 45 The public, rather than industry or 
science, was the catalyst for policy change and implementation.  As a result, Swedish policy 
pioneered the argument that tight controls would retain antibiotics for more effective 
human use.  
 
 
Table 2: Modern Intergovernmental AMR policy development, 1998-2015 
 
Date Parent body Report/action Comment 
1998 WHA World Health Assembly resolution 
WHA 51.7 
Proposes that there is enough evidence 
to act on AMR 
2001 WHO WHO Global Strategy for 
Containment of Antimicrobial 
Resistance 
Made eight clusters of actions needed 
to reduce AMR by different interest 
groups: prescribers, patients, hospitals, 
vets, Governments, industry 
2001 Codex Alimentarius 
Commission 
Report of Executive Committee 
meeting June 28-29, 2001 
Saw future competition between 
human and animal use; made request to 
address AMR as both human and animal 
problem 
2001 European Commission European Council 
Recommendation 2002/77/EC 
Proposed multidisciplinary 
Coordination at EU level (following 1998 
EU Conference on AMR in Copenhagen) 
2003 FAO, OIE, WHO Joint Expert Workshop on Non-
Human Antimicrobial Usage and 
Antimicrobial Resistance Scientific 
assessment  
High level co-ordination requires 
improved data and agreement on 
classification 
2005 WHA World Health Assembly resolution 
WHA A58/14 
At the WHA, member states expressed 
concern at lack of progress since 1998 
2005 EU Ban on feeding of all antibiotics and 
related drugs to livestock for 
growth-promotion purposes 
Took effect January 1, 2006 
2007 FAO, WHO, OIE Report of Joint FAO/WHO/OIE 
Expert Meeting on Critically 
Brought together human and animal 
perspectives around concept of there 
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Important Antimicrobials being critically important Antimicrobials 
for both; agreed common classification 
system 
2007 WHA Resolution WHA 60/16 Follow up by member states to 2005 
resolution 
2008 WHO Creation of Advisory Group on 
Integrated Surveillance of 
Antimicrobial Resistance (AGISAR). 
20 person group to advise WHO on 
implementation of strategy; met four 
times 2009-12 
2009 WHO Advisory Group on 
Integrated Surveillance of 
Antimicrobial Resistance 
(AGISAR). 
Critically Important Antimicrobials 
for Human Medicine (2
nd
 revision) 
Further expressions of expert concern 
2011 Transatlantic Taskforce Recommendations for future 
collaboration between the US and 
EU 
Outlines and recommends future 
collaboration to tackle AMR 
2011 European Commission Action plan against the rising 
threats from antimicrobial 
resistance 
Outlines a roadmap for EU actions 
2011-15 
2011 WHO Director-General World Health Day 2011: Combat 
drug resistance: no action today 
means no cure tomorrow, 
Statement by WHO Director-
General 
Proposed six clusters of actions: 
national plans, surveillance, essential 
medicines supply, regulation for both 
animals & human use, prevention, 
innovation 
2012 WHO The evolving threat of 
antimicrobial resistance: Options 
for action 
Presentation of information and 
analysis to support WHO strategy. 
2014 WHO Draft global action plan Both the result of and accelerated 
global consultation 
2014 Antimicrobial Review International Commission chaired 
ďǇ Jiŵ O͛Neill, foƌŵeƌ GoldŵaŶ 
Sachs chief economist 
This argues a business-oriented case for 
investment in new drugs 
2015 WHO Global action plan  Presented to 68
th
 World Health 
Assembly 
 
 
The picture that emerges from Tables 1 and 2 is intriguing.  With such a weight of official 
aŶd ͚heaǀǇǁeight͛ ƌepoƌts ĐalliŶg foƌ aĐtioŶ, it is Ŷot possiďle to aƌgue poliĐǇ has failed due 
to lack of evidence. A common complaint by scientists that: ͚if oŶlǇ the policy-evidence gap 
was narrowed, policy makers would be convinced about the need for action͛. Rather, it is 
the portrait of a more complex policy battle between positions and interests, not captured 
by the use/abuse interpretation of events which posits that technologies (in this case 
antimicrobials) are neutral and that the key policy challenge is how to ensure they used 
appropriately and not abused. This has been noted by other researchers.45 Even when 
powerful evidence is given for change, policy-makers can remain unable or unwilling to 
implement changes in drug use whether for food production or healthcare.  This shift from 
policy to implementation appears to have been elusive, despite copious warnings. As a 
result, by the 21st century the ecological web has tightened and the room for policy 
manoeuvre has narrowed.  Given the wealth of early warnings on AMR for both animal and 
human use, the failure to see that humans and animals co-exist in the same eco-system is all 
the more remarkable. As a 1992 study by the US General Accounting Office of antibiotic use 
in recombinant bovine growth hormone (rBGH) showed, the FDA had erroneously divorced 
animal guidelines from human ones.46 Even though rBGH raised more problems about 
animals than for humans, the GAO͛s ǀeƌdiĐt is iŶteƌestiŶg; dispassioŶatelǇ, it ƌeĐogŶised the 
need to link human and animal use in one policy framework. Over 20 years later, the FDA͛s 
antibiotic surveillance system is now being criticised for being overly reliant on the 
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regulatory target, the pharmaceutical companies, for its operating funds, thereby opening 
itself once again to concerns around undue influence on regulations, policy implementation 
and conflicts of interest.47 Still today, the US food system facilitates antimicrobial use; the 
US United Soybean Board, a trade body, for example, promotes antimicrobials in feedstuffs 
for export.48 
 
Making sense of the policy situation: how has AMR been 
maintained? 
 
Hindsight about the past confers an extraordinary degree of analytic power to later policy 
analysts. The argument emerged from our account here does not need to invoke hindsight 
at all. As we saw, the warnings of the consequences of misuse had come from the 
originators of the biological agents themselves, prior to their industrialised use. What has 
happened instead is precisely what had been feared: a potential frittering away of the 
immense benefits of discovered biological agents.  For the lessons to be drawn for public 
policy, different questions arise.  Given the source and clarity of such warnings, how could 
such a situation possibly have occurred? Further, rather than solely focussing on ignored 
warnings, is it not legitimate to ask what has reinforced the policy refusal to act? How, in 
other words, has the policy discourse maintained and fuelled rather than slowed down the 
growth of AMR? We now explore some possible explanations.  
 
Explanation 1: resistance to policy frameworks based on complexity 
 
The message from the originators of antibiotics was founded on an appreciation of the 
importance of biological complexity and the dynamic character of biological-environment 
interchange. Policy advisors and makers, however, find complexity problematic. They tend 
to idealise neat cause and effect explanations and clear impact effects, whereas complexity 
is haƌd to ͚sell͛ to decision makers and superiors. As implementers, they face real  problems 
in coordinating multi-level interventions. So the challenges are both at the analytical end, 
and the implementation end.  
 
AMR, however, is a problem which requires not just multilevel policy interventions sought 
by Tomson and Vlad,11 but actions which link biological, material, economic, political and 
cultural dynamics within one coherent policy framework. This is ͚messy͛ to those ǁho desiƌe 
poliĐǇ aŶd ͚poliĐǇ deliǀeƌǇ͛ to have neat, clear linkages between cause and effect. Despite 
policy documents and calls for coherence growing over time (see Tables 1 and 2 above), the 
actual responses have remained stubbornly fragmented. ‘eǀieǁs suĐh as the WHO͛s ϮϬϭϮ 
outline of policy options suggested that AMR requires multiple actions on multiple levels 
from multiple actors,5 but there is little evidence as yet of multi-party, multi-actor, multi-
level systemic engagement. Perhaps Sweden has gone the furthest in attempting an 
integrated policy framework, and that for agricultural use mainly, but in world agricultural 
terms, it is a tiny actor. Indeed, this might be why it has acted – partly because its farm 
sector is not sufficiently powerful to be able to maintain a ͚ƌight͛ to ƌoutiŶe aŶtiŵiĐƌoďial 
use, and partly because of its fairly strong ŵodeƌŶ tƌaditioŶ of ĐoŶsultatiǀe ;͚Đoƌpoƌatist͛Ϳ 
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governance.  
 
This exceptionalism suggests that resistance to the development of an integrated position 
on AMR is more the norm.   Across the globe, there have been modifications in this sector or 
that, to this or that category of usage, such as to ͚Đustoŵ aŶd pƌaĐtiĐe͛ iŶ poultƌǇ use and 
some medical practice, but nothing that could be deemed co-ordinated policy action, let 
alone a paradigm shift.  
 
Policy-makers also have not accepted fully the implications for both agriculture and medical 
practice from the real life complexities of microbial ecology, namely that life-forms are in a 
slow flux across species. OŶ the ĐoŶtƌaƌǇ, ďoth ŵediĐal pƌaĐtiĐe aŶd ĐoŶsuŵeƌ ͚deŵaŶd͛ 
have reinforced inappropriate use of antimicrobials, one by seeking satisfied patient-
customers who demand pills and the other the pursuit of ͞cheap͟ meat from industrial-
scale food production systems. This intensification of demand has clear environmental 
impacts too, such as manure waste from animal production systems. There is thus a policy 
lock-in restricting the potential of creating an integrated approach across both human 
medicine and animal husbandry.  One exception may be the global response  to the threats 
to public health and global trade from avian and swine flu strains that typically arise on 
Asian farms and have the potential to break out to human populations far away;  but even 
in this case, there has been little attention to the issue of widespread use of antibiotics in 
livestock and poultry that intersect with some of the same production practices that 
contribute to influenza risk and spread.49   
 
In this failure to address complexity, some similarities can be noted to what is observed 
about other large-scale issues in public health such as obesity and climate change. These are 
issues apparently so large that they dwarf existing institutional capacity in their requirement 
for engagement of multiple actors around multiple levers. If no single institution or coalition  
is aware of a public health problem –as was the case for HIV/AIDS, for example, before its 
aetiology was clarified in 1981 50, 51–policy-makers can be forgiven if their actions make an 
emerging situation worse. Copious amounts of information and evidence have flowed on 
AMR, however, as they have for obesity and climate change over decades, yet policy-makers 
have not managed to confront or challenge the environmental conditions of human design 
and creation, despite these generating and worsening the problems. 
 
Features of the AMR crisis draw particular parallels to the global crisis in obesity. Whereas 
HIV/AIDS posed a threat of contagion (a specific disease seemingly out of control which 
might spread) and possessed a fear factor (with its own complications of victim-blaming), 
with obesity and AMR there is  a situation of ͚policy cacophony͛ described above.12 In 
addition, for AMR as with obesity, there were and are strong monied forces opposed to 
systemic change as well as there being divided, competing and divergent strands of policy 
argument. The net effect of this mix has been to marginalise serious consideration being 
given to an integrative system perspective with due implications for systemic change.  
 
A key ingredient for robust policy is to have an informed and strong civic pressure on policy 
makers. This was the case for HIVAIDS, at least in Western states, where a powerful 
combination of gay activists, medical scientists and public health analysts (across the range 
from education to economics) set out with urgency to convince policy makers that 
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prevention was needed and worth the investment. In fact, important politicians were 
convinced and did take action, even in Britain uŶdeƌ Mƌs ThatĐheƌ͛s pƌeŵieƌship.52 This has 
not been the case for AMR or obesity.  
 
The combination of inside-science and inside-society pressures has been missing for AMR 
policy until relatively recently.  To advance a future where antibiotics are not overused, and  
remain effective for longer, what may be required is a mix of patient power demanding drug 
retention for sound use and consumer power demanding different values across the food 
system -- rejecting routine drug use in pursuit of mass, cheap meat whatever the cost to 
ecosystems or human health, for example. Although there are pockets of consumer 
activism, it is currently the case that this cultural element has not taken off in AMR policy. It 
deserves more attention.  
 
One sub-feature within the complexity explanation is also worthy of consideration; it 
concerns food antimicrobial use rather than human use. For many reasons, the food 
systems of developed economies appear to have created ever longer supply chains. These 
have been shown to make transparency harder, even in simple industrialised foods such as 
bread.53 The inquiry into the European 2013 horsemeat scandal noted how everyday 
processed meat products had labyrinthine international supply chains and connections, 
making surveillance and trust harder.54 This man-made food system compounds biological 
and scientific complexity. The WHO has noted that, despite some improvements in 
surveillance, the norm remains a lack of transparency about food chains and poor 
knowledge of the full biological effects of AMR .55 In many developing and developed 
countries, sales and use of drugs are poorly monitored and documented, although some 
countries such as India have been estimated to have experienced a virtual doubling of 
antimicrobial use since 2005;5 it does now claim to have clear AMR policies.56 
 
Explanation 2: an inappropriate Ǯwar on bugsǯ narrative 
 
Antimicrobials were and still are presented as being the ͚big guns͛ in a health war. If Dubos 
raised a sceptical eye in the initial years of mass antibiotic use, contemporary biologists like 
Judith Crawford have  been rare in questioning the appropriateness of the ͚ǁaƌ agaiŶst 
geƌŵs͛ ŵetaphoƌ upon which popular compliance so depends.57  The image that antibiotics 
are weapons in a war against germs seriously misrepresents how the natural microbial 
world really works. Indeed, the war analogy undermines the case for integrated and 
comprehensive AMR policy and interventions.  There are more appropriate metaphors than 
war, such as feedback loops, systems dynamics and resilience.58 Indeed, these are now 
informing the current interest in a new wave of investment in drugs, as we discuss later. 
 
If anything of value is to emerge from the collective embrace of the ͚ǁaƌ oŶ ďugs͛ ŵetaphoƌ 
it could be the eventual understanding that the war is being lost, in part because humans 
are fighting it against themselves and in part because it is fighting an environment changed 
by humans. With its more than 9 billion farm animals raised for meat production each year, 
the U.S. also produces massive amounts of manure.  And as has been noted, the vast 
majority of U.S. antibiotics sales are destined for these animals as well. Around 75% of 
antibiotics fed to animals pass directly through the gut into faecal waste and then is applied 
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back onto the land, becoming a means of environmental entry of both antibiotic residues 
and gene-based determinants of antibiotic resistance (genes, plasmids, etc.).
59
 The 2012 
WHO Report on AMR, while attesting to its importance, saw this issue as beyond its scope,5  
despite its importance. This situation potentially suits some protagonists who do not want 
public trust in the food industry to be harmed, nor the vast sums spent by food companies 
aŶd theiƌ ͚fƌoŶt͛ oƌgaŶisatioŶs on public relations to be questioned .60 Questions about the 
need to change production and use can be countered by a combination of effective lobbying 
and arguments about jobs, trade, contribution to GDP, or just doubts being thrown on 
proof.   
 
The war metaphor and analysis is actually a popularisation of a version of risk analysis, in 
which advantages and disadvantages of antimicrobial use are presumed to be in a constant 
trade-off which needs to be carefully managed by humans. The value-neutral outcome of 
AMR, in this narrative, represents a lack of information or poor risk assessment. It invokes 
the use/abuse model of science and technology which posits that technologies and scientific 
developments are intrinsically neutral aŶd ƌeŶdeƌed ͚good͛ oƌ ͚ďad͛ oŶlǇ ďǇ huŵan choice, 
shaped by use or abuse.61 This is what the recent UK guidance note from NICE cited earlier 
invokes: sensible antibiotic use by doctors and health workers could be reduced by 25%. 
This use/abuse approach is actually not helpful.  The alternative narrative fits AMR better; 
this proposes that technologies – antibiotics, here–embed particular values; their use 
embodies and reflects certain ͚fƌaŵiŶg assuŵptioŶs͛.62, 63 In the case of antibiotics use, such 
assumptions include that ͚bugs͛ can be ͚beaten͛, and that humans can and should control 
life-forms for their own purposes. These assumptions have had considerable appeal to 
policy makers and industrial agricultural and food business interests, but their usefulness to 
business interested has thankfully now started to be questioned. The World Economic 
Foƌuŵ͛s 2013 annual Global Risks report, for example, highlighted the risk to business from 
AMR.64 The worry is that markets might be compromised by its spread.  
 
Explanation 3: a belief in technological fix 
 
Notable public health successes in recent decades, more often than not, have represented 
progress as being dependent on technological fixes, from new vaccinations and smokestack 
scrubbers to the flush toilet. The trick is to distinguish problems amenable to technological 
fixes from those that are not, and to appreciate that some short-term fixes might only be 
appropriate as an interim substitute for longer-term, more sustainable or robust measures. 
In the case of AMR, the routinisation of antibiotic use among humans and animals can be 
seen as one logical outcome of a broader techno-economic vision for economic 
development, in effect the conditions of progress being aligned with a succession of 
incremental technological fixes. In this analysis, technology drives wealth, and wealth 
generates health. This explanation was much invoked to justify the so-Đalled ͚gƌeeŶ 
ƌeǀolutioŶ͛ iŶ 20th century farming. In that, nature was cast as a block or limit to 
productivity; these had to be overcome by human ingenuity, i.e. science into practice.65-67 
This logic also was apparent in relation to AMR in the 1950s, for example, when use of 
routine feed antibiotics was thought to increase the growth rate of US pigs by an average 
10-20%, saving labour and other costs; the appeal was obvious.68 Using the latest 
comparative data, by 2011, farm use of antimicrobials in the USA was almost four times that 
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of human use, accounting for 29.9 m lbs against 7.7 m lbs for use by sick humans;69 and 
even that was beginning to backfire, as CDC notes.
70
  
 
When early doubts about AMR were being voiced by Fleming or Dubos, it was perhaps 
understandable that to stand in the path of routine use of antibiotics could be depicted as 
being anti-progress and anti-business. A half century on, business and policy makers surely 
have more eǆpeƌieŶĐe of ͚uŶiŶteŶded ĐoŶseƋueŶĐes͛, the iŶeǀitaďilitǇ of ͚tƌade-offs͛, aŶd 
other notes of caution. In the EU, one effect of heightened awareness of risk management 
has been the introduction of the precautionary principle in policy making.71 This differs from 
the US regulatory model, which typically requires scientific evidence to justify restrictions on 
the use of a particular technology.72 In effect, the principle is entirely reversed. 
Fluoroquinolone antibiotics, for example, were FDA-approved for use on poultry flocks via 
addition to their drinking water supplies, despite warnings that this practice would spur 
resistance to form to the fluoroquinolones – a critically important class of drugs to human 
medicine. Almost immediately, such resistance was noted to develop among Campylobacter 
bacteria, a common contaminant on poultry meat.73  The FDA fought in court (ultimately 
successfully) to force the sole remaining company making the poultry product to withdraw it 
from the market, which took five years in total.74, 75    
 
Modern food supply chains are long and have many linkages. Within them knowledge is 
fragmented, dissipated and frequently restricted. For the business community, and to some 
extent for policy makers, the temptation to continue to use economic productivity as the 
preferred measure of the health of these supply chains remains strong, even as it downplays 
longer terms costs of AMR and other threats to food safety, resilience or sustainability. 
From that perspective, theƌe is Ŷo Ŷeed foƌ the EU͛s pƌeĐautioŶaƌǇ principle, which is 
viewed instead a mask for protectionism. This issue might seem far from public health but a 
study undertaken for the European Parliament accepted that this principle is now put at risk 
through the proposed EU-US trade agreement TTIP (Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership) ŶotiŶg that ͞convergence runs the risk of weakening, if not eliminating, (the 
current European) conception of consumer and environmental protection.͟ 72 The effect, 
say its critics, is to expand corporate rights to challenge national and local regulations for 
food and farming systems.  Is the TTIP poised to maintain the conditions which will continue 
the development of AMR? 
 
Explanation 4: different strategies are needed for humans and animals 
 
The technical perspective on effective antibiotics governance (discussed above) is 
exacerbated by the split of attention between human and animal use; doctors are nominally 
in control of the former and veterinarians of the latter. Though devised for human use 
initially, antibiotics were quickly and extensively applied to farm animals, often at a mass, 
not individual scale, and increasingly as a part of a particular model of industrialised, 
intensive livestock production system. In the 1940s, the growth-promoting effects of certain 
pharmaceutical compounds on animals was first observed and the United States Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA) approved their use as feed additives without veterinary 
prescription in 1951.44 In June 2015, the FDA finalised its Veterinary Feed Directive which, 
by the end of 2016, will require that veterinarians sign off on a directive for all remaining 
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feed additive antibiotics. Until then, while some classes of antibiotics are used only for 
animals, many – including penicillins, tetracyclines, macrolides, streptogramins and 
sulfonamides– are both used clinically for ill human patients and routinely to promote 
weight gain and prevent disease in food animals. Additional antibiotics, such as third 
generation cephalosporins and gentamicin, have been injected routinely into eggs as an 
uŶappƌoǀed oƌ ͚off laďel͛ use, despite theiƌ iŵpoƌtaŶĐe to huŵaŶ ŵediĐiŶe. 
 
In effect, this mixed market has been precisely the drug-shopping scenario Fleming once 
warned against. It has contributed to farm environments where reservoirs of resistance to 
multiple antibiotics exist in water supplies or in soil and among farmers and farm workers. 
Surveillance of retail meat from many countries also demonstrates reservoirs of multidrug 
resistant bacteria in the global meat supply, especially in chicken and pork. The US National 
Antimicrobial Resistance Monitoring System (NARMS) found that supermarket meat 
samples collected in 2011 harboured significant amounts of salmonella and campylobacter 
which together caused 3.4 million cases of food poisoning a year. 9% of raw chicken and 
ϭϬ% of ƌaǁ tuƌkeǇ saŵples ǁeƌe taiŶted ǁith the ͚supeƌďug͛ ǀaƌiaŶts of salmonella; 74% of 
these samples were antibiotic resistant in 2011 compared to 50% in 2002.76 The split 
between human and animal use confuses rather than helps policy makers to address AMR.  
 
 
Explanation 5: economic costs can arbitrate policy action 
 
In the early phase of antimicrobial use on farms and humans (from the mid 20thcentury), the 
profitability on pharmaceutical investment was high. According to numerous accounts, this 
is no longer the case. A central argument of the 2014 Commission chaired by former 
Goldman Sachs economist Jiŵ O͛Neill (made a Minister and put into the House of Lords by 
the Conservative Government elected in 2015) is that governments need to incentivise 
pharmaceutical companies to tackle AMR.4 Gone is the war metaphor. The discourse 
offeƌed ďǇ the O͛Neill CoŵŵissioŶ is that the economic framework needs to be rewritten to 
encourage global pharmaceutical companies to invest in the development of new, 
expensive antibiotics.77-79  Others meanwhile argue that such drugs are intrinsically low-
margin products and that only mass scale use warrants such development, and that the 
pharmaceutical industry is locked into selling antibiotics as farm productivity enhancement 
products and is unlikely to desist until regulated. It is this last explanation which may help 
explain why, until 2005 Bayer Corporation was marketing a fluoroquinolone antibiotic 
product for mass use in poultry flocks long after FDA-compiled evidence had concluded that 
such use was spurring development and contamination of poultry meat with FQ-resistant 
campylobacter, a major foodborne pathogen.73  Meanwhile, Bayer also marketed 
Ciprofloxacin, the increasingly ineffective human fluoroquinolone that was and is a drug of 
choice for treating people eating this same chicken meat and contracting resistant 
campylobacterosis.   
 
An assumption in this explanation is that cost is the ultimate or best arbiter of policy. That 
public health interventions and policy options are often costed may be true, but this is not 
the same thing as assuming that cost will determine appropriate policy or action. Indeed, 
the case of AMR shows this not to be the case. The economic costs of AMR are extremely 
high, whether the policy focus is on-farm or in human health. One hospital study in Chicago, 
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USA, in 2008, looking at just 188 patients, estimated that the total attributable medical and 
societal cost of AMR infection in those patients alone was at least $13.35 million.
80
 
Extrapolated to the entire USA, AMR has been estimated to result in treatment costs in 
hospitals alone as high as $26 billion, measured in 2000 dollars; in 2012 dollar values, the 
figure could be nearly $35 billion, and nearly $70 billion if lost work and other societal costs 
are included.7, 70 For the European Union, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and 
Control has estimated that AMR results in 25,000 deaths annually and has related costs of 
over €ϭ.5 ďillioŶ in healthcare expenses and productivity losses.81 With such high costs, are 
the attributable costs of antibiotic resistance not high enough to justify more assertive 
policy to reduce antibiotics misuse and overuse, including in livestock production?82 Costs 
aside, the health toll is large. The US Centers for Disease Control has estimated that 2 
million people sicken in the US with antibiotic-resistant infections and 23,000 die annually.70  
The sad but unpalatable conclusion has to be that, far from cost driving policy reform, high 
costs have been normalised. 
 
Explanation 6: a behavioural and moral problem 
 
We now examine a cultural explanation for the maintenance of AMR. Could it be that AMR 
is exacerbated by sloppy or stupid or immoral behaviour by humans in their quest for 
control over nature? Certainly, the history of public health has included a strong cultural-
behavioural element.13 The understanding of the significance of poor health-related 
behaviour and the difficulty in changing them are hardly new; one can think of the 
difficulties Ignaz Semmelweis encountered when arguing for hand-washing procedures by 
doctors attending childbirth in the mid-19thcentury.83  So is AMR being reinforced by poor 
behaviouƌ, ƌeƋuiƌiŶg Đultuƌal ƌatheƌ thaŶ fiŶaŶĐial iŶĐeŶtiǀes aŶd ͚ĐoƌƌeĐtioŶs͛? CeƌtaiŶlǇ, 
there is more than a hint of morality in AMR guidance invoking cost saving or waste 
reduction. Even putting such overtones aside, the view that inappropriate prescribing of 
antibiotics in healthcare settings is in part a behavioural problem seems plausible; appeals 
are made to this or that actor – now consumers, now doctors - to desist. Calls for adherence 
to antibiotic stewardship guidelines and voluntary programs have become increasingly 
strident.  If AMR is at root a behavioural issue, then it must be rooted in a particular national 
context.  Some European countries link their own low rates of healthcare associated AMR 
with low levels of antibiotic prescribing.80 Attention to behavioural cultures among hospital 
staff has ďeeŶ seeŶ as a ͚suĐĐess stoƌǇ͛ with reduction in MRSA bloodstream infections 
falling 18-fold (from 1.3% to less than 0.1%) since 2006 and a 5-fold reduction in clostridium 
difficile infections (from 2% to 0.4%) over the same period. Even so around 300,000 patients 
a year in England in 2011 acquire a healthcare-associated infection, a prevalence rate of 
6.4%.84 
 
But is it a behavioural explanation for AMR to say that it is an outgrowth of consumer 
pressure? Perhaps. Patients demand antibiotics and consumers demand cheap meat, this 
line of argument suggests, and therefore lock the health professions or the food supply 
chain into collusion. This does not, however, fullǇ aĐĐouŶt foƌ ĐoŶsuŵeƌs͛ laĐk of 
understanding of the nature or consequences of resistance, or the threat to antibiotic 
effectiveness.   
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If consumers do see drugs as ͚magic bullets͛ for all ailments, policy makers should consider 
how such beliefs were created and sustained, and how they can be managed. In this regard, 
one interesting development is the creation of new and growing civil society coalitions 
calling for curtailed antibiotic use.85, 86 These may open up culture change without this 
being seen as top-down, moralistic or hectoring. They were effective in Sweden in the 
1980s, so why not elsewhere since? International civic or citizen campaigns are, in our 
judgement, needed but they are hard and expensive to organise; billions of dollars might be 
estiŵated ďǇ the O͛Neill CoŵŵissioŶ as Ŷeeded to iŶĐeŶtiǀise Big Phaƌŵa to Đƌeate Ŷeǁ 
categories of antimicrobials but only a tiny fraction is offered for culture change. The EU has 
been funding AMR media-based campaigns targeting consumers at a member state level 
since 2009 which it claims to be effective; but these concentrate almost wholly on human 
use rather than on livestock or veterinarian use. The 2010 EU Eurobarometer survey on 
AMR showed considerable and intriguing variations in national consumer understanding of 
direct human health.87 A repeat survey in 2013 showed some improvement.88 Why is there 
such variation? How can new behaviour be instilled into this cultural mix? That behavioural 
campaigns can make a difference has been shown by integrated efforts in Belgium and 
France.89 In the USA, the CDC aŶd otheƌs͛ communication campaigns have been seen to 
make a difference, but have been constrained by continued antibiotic use in animal 
husbandry.  We see this cultural dimension as intrinsic to any ecological public health 
strategy.  As we have argued above, the AMR challenge requires integrated action to link 
the societal, the biological, the material and the cultural elements. 
 
Looking ahead: will policy address the complexity? 
 
AMR is a problem of evolutionary complexity.  As Baquero and colleagues have argued, 
because of the feedback loops of complex systems, no single intervention will ever be 
sufficient and only the use of multiple, wide-ranging associations of interventions might be 
able to produce an overall positive synergistic effect.36 Defining and adopting an ecological 
public health policy perspective, the paper therefore has argued that biological change has 
to be core to the public health analysis of AMR; such a perspective has been marginal to 
current policy debates, but the case for it strengthens as more stakeholders accept its 
premise that systems problems like AMR require multiple policy levers, and multi-level 
action.  
 
There may be some reversibility to AMR but the more years of activity go into creating 
ecological reservoirs of resistance, the more difficult and less successful it is likely to be to 
reverse the damage already done.. The expense and uncertainty of success in finding new 
novel classes of antibiotics makes this equation particularly troubling, and threatens 
healthcare let alone national budgets. As with climate change and obesity, there are 
encouraging signs that policy makers accept the problem has progressed already to the 
point where only some degree of adaptation to it may ultimately be possible. That is not an 
excuse for inaction. It is a reminder of the urgency of the task. Public health leadership on 
AMR is therefore required, as any review of the situation must conclude that the current 
policy mix is not working; if it was, AMR would be under control. There are signs of some 
movement by some sections of the meat industry.90 This needs to be global since supply 
chains are global. Nor can the public health movement, including the professional leaders 
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within the civil services, generate requisite change on their own; mass citizen (rather than 
consumerist) concern is needed to put pressure on both medical and veterinarian use.  
Consumer values surely need to change; they probably need to pay more for better quality 
meat grown without antibiotic use in intensive food production systems; for nutrition 
reasons, the rich societies need to contain burgeoning consumption, anyway. There are 
advantages to health and the environment from keeping meat production in more clearly 
defined environmental limits.  Consumers also need responsive governmental structures, at 
multiple governance levels, ready and willing to put health, consumer and environmental 
protection above those of industry lobbies. 91  
 
To conclude, this paper has agreed with those who argue that the AMR crisis requires a 
global, unified public health approach, much as has been successfully undertaken for 
smallpox elimination and curbing tobacco consumption, and ought to be applied to obesity. 
To confront antibiotic overuse, and overcome policy inertia, campaigns are needed to 
provide leadership across medical, veterinarian, health education, consumer, farmer and 
grower bodies. Based on past performance, and for reasons which have been discussed, we 
do not anticipate early political leadership on this, but the politicians deserve and need 
better briefing and scrutiny from an ecological public health perspective. All governments 
and oppositions need to be reminded that the destruction of antibiotics is happening on 
their watch. This is a problem that cannot be pushed into the future.  
 
Adopting an ecological public health perspective with respect to AMR also means moving 
beyond the bio-ŵediĐal ŵodel͛s foĐus oŶ the iŶdiǀidual patieŶt or the individual meat-
producer. Patients are not simply consumers of antibiotics, nor farmers simply purveyors of 
cheap meat, as the market model can often present them. Public health requires 
population-scale actions. Because there is a public interest in having antimicrobials that 
work, the use of antimicrobials is more than an individual decision between patients and 
doctors or veterinarians. A recent paper proposed a tough new international Framework 
Convention, as for tobacco.92 This should be debated. It might be one mechanism, among 
many, which builds pressure for systemic change. 
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